

SECRET

STATEMENT

Place: Building 760, NCISRU Guantanamo Bay, Cuba

Date: 17JUN06

(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(7)(C)

R, make the following free and voluntary statement to Special whom I know to be a Representative of the United States Naval Criminal Investigative Service. I make this statement of my own free will and without any threats made to me or promises extended. I fully understand that this statement is given concerning my knowledge of the three detainee deaths which occurred in the Alpha Block of Camp 1 at Camp Delta, Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (JTF-GTMO), during the early morning hours of 10JUN06. (b)(3)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

I am the Commander of the Joint Detention Group (JDG) and I am responsible for a guard force of over 1000 individuals whose mission is to provide safe care and custody to all detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (GTMO). I arrived at GTMO on Saturday, 16APR05, and took Command of JDG on 22APR05. I replaced (b)(3):10 USC §1305 (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(3):10 USC

I was told by Major General HOOD who said he was relaying guidance given to him personally from the Secretary of Defense, that JTF-GTMO was to come in compliance with the Geneva Convention (particularly the 3rd Geneva Convention) to the greatest degree possible without compromising security. Within the past year there have been numerous changes made at Camp Delta, including many small changes, in order to bring us into greater compliance with the Geneva Convention. Many of the changes came at the urging of the International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC). I was responsible for carrying out the guidance from MG HOOD. As I made the changes, I looked at the security aspect of the changes more from the point of view of guard safety, rather than protecting the detainees from themselves. Though there had been numerous suicide attempts, the real attempts had been made by those who were depressed or mentally disturbed and we had procedures in place to care for them in conjunction with the Behavioral Health Section who I work closely with. As I made each decision I primarily looked at two things. First, does what I am changing increase the possibility of detainee escape, and second, what is the possibility of a guard being harmed if this change is implemented. The guidance given was basically to improve the quality of life of the detainees. For everything I did to improve detainee quality of life there was some degree of resistance from the guard force, including the leadership immediately subordinate to me. If the guards do not like the changes, it affects how the changes will be implemented. If the changes are not made in the proper spirit then those changes could backfire on us. For example, if the new standard was 2 hours recreation, a guard who was disgruntled about the change could easily cause a block of detainees to be upset by not getting all detainees through the rotation. I think perhaps because so many changes have come at the guards so fast, that although they became willing to accept change, that in turn, we may have created confusion in their minds. Camp 1 guards were perhaps lulled into a belief that because we put so much emphasis on improving the quality of life for detainees that the threat level of the Camp was decreased. Guards were constantly taking care of prisoners and handling prisoner requests, which may have

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

SECRET

Page 1/11

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)(C)

EXHIBIT (48)

NCIS

1054

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

caused an erosion of the duty of custody, and moved the focus more toward detainee care and comfort at the detriment of guard alertness to inappropriate behavior of detainees.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)

Leadership made quite a distinction between detainee treatment in Camps 1 and (b)(2)

(b)(2) The population of Camp 1 had gone down in the past month because of problems we had with detainees damaging their sinks in MAY/JUNE 06. Detainees in Camp 1 were taking the springs out of their sinks and using them to fabricate a tool, which we believed could be used to attack the guards. We put the detainees who were doing this into another camp because sinks in that camp had been modified and did not have the springs. Subsequent to 18MAY06, the population of Camp 1 dropped to slightly under 100 from over 200, and it seemed that the detainees left in Camp 1 were fairly compliant and had no immediate intentions of carrying acts of misconduct.

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(2)

(b)(2) and Camp 1 is compliant. (b)(2)

(b)(2) Camp 1 used to be the primary focal point of the detention center because it was the most populated Camp and because I described it to my guard force as the real pivot point. Camp 1 contains compliant detainees and our goal always was to bring as many detainees as possible in to the compliant or highly compliant category. Our strategy was to make life the best we possibly could for the detainees, considering the facilities they were housed in, such as to encourage good behavior. Those that chose to violate the rules of the camp were sent to discipline or segregation blocks in (b)(2) where within standards of the GC and while being completely humane we made life less desirable on those blocks with stricter standards. Those that continued compliant behavior on a compliant block for an extended period of time would eventually be rewarded with highly compliant status and a subsequent move to (b)(2) where life is the best it possibly can be in the Camp Delta complex. Within Camp 1 at the time of the 10JUN06, incident there were (b)(2) and Alpha. (b)(2) held very compliant detainees, who were basically waiting for space to move to (b)(2) Every detainee on Alpha block is there for a particular reason.

(b)(1),(b)(2)

The Camp Delta Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) manual lays out the way the JDG is to be run. The latest full republishing of the SOP was in DEC05. We had basically been working on this since I arrived. Updating the SOP was primarily the responsibility of my S3 shop (operations) and S5 Shop (civil liaison and planning section). The changes were orchestrated by (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) The changes were basically made to incorporate all the Guard Mount messages since the last SOP, which was published DEC04. Guard mount messages are directions/orders to the guard force

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

1003

(b)(3)
(b)(6) disseminated via the Detainee Information Management System (DIMS). A guard mount message often fills a void we have discovered in the SOP or in some instances modifies an existing practice due to changing circumstances. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7) obtain information and gauge what is going on in the camps based on a variety of sources and inputs. I have used this information to assist me in modifying procedures and in developing new procedures to meet the ever changing challenges and situations in the Camp Delta complex of camps. I am the approving official for SOP changes. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7) every morning at 0900 with the exception of Sunday, I meet with all Camp Commanders, so that they can brief me on previous days events. The meetings include, everyone who is in charge of each camp, both of my battalion commanders, mental health representatives, the senior medical officer from the Joint Medical Group, the cultural advisor from the JTF, Interrogation Control Element Operations and pretty much a representative of all groups that work here. I also routinely check DIMS system during the day as it provides information on activity in the blocks and I walk through the camps at various times of the day. (b)(1)

(b)(1)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7) Guards are briefed on new guard mount messages during guard mounts held in each camp by their camp leadership prior to each shift. New guard mount messages are also put into DIMS. Camp 1 in particular is a dynamic Camp and changes are made on a regular basis. I brief significant changes in practices up to the Commander Joint Task Force (CJTF) Guantanamo (Presently RDML HARRIS and previously MG HOOD). For example, the lighting levels on the cells at night were briefed up, and comfort items allowed to detainees were briefed up. Minor changes, however, are not briefed up. I remained and do continue to remain in continuous contact with the CJTF. This contact includes standing meetings throughout the week and phone calls throughout the day to review and significant events in the camps and changes necessary to standing orders. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6) Relevant passages from the DEC05 SOP, and additional guard messages with potential relevance to the incidents of 10JUN06, are addressed below. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6) The SOP related to lighting in cells (para 8-29, page 37) during darkness in Camp 1 is to turn off half the lights on the tier. Cells in Camp 1 do not have lights inside the cell. The lights are on the ceiling of the tier and shine into the cells. So one side of the tier is lit and the other is not. This makes it more difficult to see into the cells on the side that are not lit. To the best of my recollection, the lights on the South side of Alpha 1, the side on which the suicides occurred were the lights that were turned off on the night of 09JUN06. The issue of lighting during sleep hours was a significant issue to the ICRC when I first arrived in O5. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6) The SOP states (para 8-5d., page 28) that there must always be at least one guard on the tier at all times. Basically there is to be no less than one guard walking the tier, but randomly two guards are to walk the block. It may be noted, however, that as detainees (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)

were granted more privileges guards had to supervise them more in their off tier activities, such as two hours of recreation a day allowed for each detainee, so one guard on tier became more the norm. (b)(2)

(b)(2),(b)(3):10 USC §130c

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

The SOP states that no showers and recreation will take place during the hours of 2200-0600 (para 8-14a.(11), page 31). ICRC considered it very important for detainees to have uninterrupted sleep. This SOP also ceases the movement of detainees during these hours (para 8-13b. page 30). (b)(2)

(b)(2)
(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

As background, ICRC comes into GTMO every two to four months and stays four to six weeks each time. The ICRC has unfettered access to each detainee and meets with generally with every detainee during their visit. They also meet with me once a week to discuss their findings. At the end of each visit they provide an out-brief to the CJTF. Finally, ICRC completes a report on what they have seen that is my understanding goes Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Detainee Affairs. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

Appendix B, of the SOP sets out the guidelines for hanging material in cells. Appendix B lays out matters of discipline within the Camps. The Appendix contains of four pages relevant to the matters of 10 JUNE. These pages define offenses and level of punishment and also lists amount of punishment time that will be given for them. It also lists what items detainees are allowed to have with them. The fourth pertinent page (B-4) is entitled, Authorized/Unauthorized Activities sets forth how detainees may use certain items on each level. Appendix B, is updated and added to the SOP on a regular basis, and is used daily by Camp leadership. Guards have access to it the same as the Camp Platoon Leader (CPL), and changes are gone over in the guard mount prior to each shift. Page B-3 is a chart that shows the items allowed, with footnotes at the bottom indicating the manner in which they may be used. Page B-4 of the appendix SOP states that sheets or blankets may be used for privacy while detainees are using the toilet, however they may not be tied more than halfway up the cell height. In addition detainees may hang items to dry in the cell window, but the items must not block the entire window. B-4 also

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

1057

(b)(3):1
0 USC

states that nothing can be hung off the cell walls. Guard messages on 07DEC05, and 24MAY06, addressed the misuse of blankets, but the focus was primarily on not allowing detainees to cover their head and shoulders when using the toilet or sink to prevent detainees from surreptitiously partaking in hunger strikes by throwing up food or putting food down the drains, because guards check the amount of food eaten by detainees.

(b)(3):10
USC

(b)(3):1
0 USC

At the time of the incident, detainees in Camp 1 were allowed to have the following items: 2 T-shirts, 2 pairs underwear, 2 detainee uniforms, 1 set of PT shorts, 2 pairs of socks, 2 blankets, a sheet, 2 towels, and a washcloth. In addition they also had a full roll of toilet paper and water bottle, shower shoes and deck shoes. Detainees also were allowed a Koran, prayer beads, prayer cap, and personal papers to be kept in their box outside their cell. Up to 20 pieces of personal mail are allowed in the cell. All these items are described at page B-3. Please note that a modification to B-3 was published in March 06. Detainees originally had only one set of clothes, but after exercise equipment was provided for detainee use in the recreational area, detainees requested more clothing items because they were sweating more. Also the Geneva Convention requires that detainees be allowed undergarments. All detainees are given a new, full water bottle with each meal (para 8-27a. page 36). Water bottles were one of the items granted to detainees by MG Hood as a means to end the first hunger strike. Apparently, they were used by at least one detainee to make "calves" for the "dummy" he placed in his bed during the incident.

(b)(3):10
USC

(b)(3):
10
USC

The SOP states on Page 42, Paragraph 9-10 Confiscation of items. Any deliberate damage done to property by a detainee is cause for removal. Holes and tearing that occurs from everyday use does not count, damage must be deliberate. There is not a section of the SOP directly related to sheets, blankets or clothing. Detainees are informed of the rules with a copy given to each detainee. This particular rule can be found in the SOP on page viii, at rule number 5 and states "You may not damage, destroy or tamper with any object, property, or security device."

(b)(3):10
USC

(b)(3):
10
USC

(b)(2)

(b)(2) There is a difference in how each camp is run in true practice. What is allowed and considered normal within each camp differs.

(b)(2) While MG HOOD was in command, any use of force by the guard force was strongly discouraged. (b)(2)

(b)(2) and force cell extractions were closely monitored by the CJTF. An atmosphere developed among camp leaders that it was sometimes easier to compromise with detainees than to strictly enforce a rule. (b)(2)

(b)(2) Under the watch of RDML HARRIS, all camps have been moving more to 100% compliance as he has stated that all detainees must comply with verbal orders. Camp 1 guards rely more on interpersonal skills to maintain compliant behavior and there was a more liberal interpretation of the SOP by the guards. Once a norm or procedure is established with detainees it is very difficult to change procedures without significant problems being created. The general concept was that the detainees in camp 1 were not causing problems, so guards and (their supervisors) were more prone to let small infractions slide by. It is a classic case of a

(b)(3):10
USC
§130b.(

(b)(3):10
USC
§130b.(b)(

1058

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

b)(2)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(2)
(b)(2)

[REDACTED]

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

On the night of 09JUN06, I was not in the Camp, I had spent the evening at Admiral HARRIS' house. It was probably 0048 or so that I was called by the detention operation center (DOC). Upon receiving the call I went straight to the DET Clinic. I fell in behind an ambulance as I was leaving my quarters in (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) and just followed it straight in to Camp 1. After being notified by the DOC and before I left my house, I called Admiral HARRIS and told him what I knew, which at that point was that there had been one suicide attempt. En route to the DET, I received another phone call from the DOC and was told two others detainees were being taken to the DET Clinic. I notified the DOC to inform Sally 1 that I would be coming in the front gate. Upon arrival at the DET clinic, I went straight to each one of the three detainees. I saw ISN 093 first, then ISN 693 and then ISN588. There was no doctor on scene at the time. The Senior Medical person was a Navy Lt. Nurse. Guards and medical personnel were around each detainee giving CPR and providing care (mostly chest compressions and bagged oxygen). Each detainee looked dead. They all had that blank look in their eyes. ISN 093 had an EKG hooked up but it was flat lining. I called the Admiral about a minute and a half after my arrival, and said to him that I think we have three dead. (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)

The first orders I remember giving were upon my arrival at the DET clinic. The Field Grade in the Wire (FGIW) who is my personal representative when I am not in Camp,

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

1059

SECRET

(b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

came up to me and asked what he should do. I said (not verbatim) "I need a 100 percent recall. I need people in, and I want every detainee woken up and checked to make sure they are alive. Somebody get to Alpha block and secure it, and get any guards involved to the conference room as we are able to relieve them off the block with substitute guards." I also called to SOG for Camp 1 to try and find out where we stood status-wise. I wanted to know how much of Camp 1 had been checked and to understand the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the detainees. (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

(b)(7)

(C)

Shortly, after this call, as I continued to mentally make decisions regarding the situation, lawyers came in to the DET Clinic and I (b)(3):10 USC §130b asked if NCIS had been notified. I said not to my knowledge, and told DOC to notify NCIS. (b)(3)

At approximately 0110, 093 was taken out of the DET on a stretcher for hospital transport and (b)(3) (b)(6) showed up roughly about the same time. (b)(3)

(b)(3) (b)(6) started work on ISN 588 and ISN 693. I observed him trying to get into his mouth (b)(2) I also gave more instructions to (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

(b)(3) who came up to me and asked what I needed. I said get to Alpha Block and make sure it was secure, because I was not sure who was in charge of the block at that time. It was now 0115, because (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) just pronounced the one detainee dead at 0115 and the next one he pronounced at 0116. I called the Joint Operations Center and told them to make notifications to the proper entities, specifying particulars. In the few minutes between 0100 and 0110 everything was chaotic with various people arriving, such as the (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) my Deputy Commander and various guards who had been called in to Camp. (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3)

(b)(6)

At approximately 0117 I stepped outside so I could place the cell phone call to the JOC to make notifications of the deaths. (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3) (b)(6)

Admiral HARRIS had arrived when I came back inside the DET Clinic a couple of minutes later. About time Admiral HARRIS arrived my FGIW gave me updates on situation. The Admiral and I then went to the two deceased detainees still in the DET Clinic, and I briefed him on what I had done and the actions being taken (guard recall, detainee check). I also informed him of which detainees were involved, and where they came from. I was still not sure how it had happened. While I suspected that had all been found hanging, I told the Admiral was not sure if they had been found hanging, but I pointed out the ligature marks on each detainee, and the material that had (b)(2)

(b)(2) of ISN 588 (one in furthest room of the DET Clinic from the entrance, the most westernly room in the Det Clinic on the south side) and was lying on his chest. It had also been reported to me that ISN 093 (b)(2). Each detainee had a thin, quarter inch line around his neck, which consisted of a dark discoloration that appeared brownish red at that point. Face coloration appeared normal. I observed a towel or something around waist of one detainee, and pieces of cloth lying around their bodies. I did not touch any of the bodies. (b)(3) (b)(6)

(b)(3)

Subsequently, the Admiral gave a pep talk to medical staff as they all appeared very despondent. I walked over to a Navy E-6, and told him to find somebody to stay with (b)(3) (b)(6)

SECRET

Page 7 of 11

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

NCIS

1060

SECRET

(b)(3)
(b)(6) each one of the bodies until NCIS arrived. At about 0125-0130, I went to the DOC which is located in my headquarters (BLDG 1) and by the time I arrived I was told the rest of Camp 1, (b)(2) had all completed checking each detainee and they were all alright, but (b)(2) had not reported being finished with a head count (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C) At roughly 0110 when (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) (my deputy commander) arrived at the DET Clinic, and I had sent her to the DOC and told her to start organizing guards coming in so that we would have three people walking every tier. At the DOC, I tried to get the people directly involved with the incident together in conference room. I told them to sit and not to talk to each other. I pulled three or four guards from Alpha block into my office to find out what had happened and put together the series of events. I had each of them speak to me for approximately 4 to 5 minutes in my office. I know what the guards I spoke with look like, but I do not know their names. The one female present, I think was named (b)(3) (b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C) Included in the first set of people I talked to were the SOG and the sailor who found ISN 093 in the cell. What I was told was that the guard that found ISN 093 had just come on to the tier. The guard walked the tier from east to west, and on his pass back to the west, he looked into Alpha 8, and said the bed didn't look right to him. It did not look human. He called the block NCO to come look, and they both yelled at ISN 093, but did not get a response. One of them went to the cell next to Alpha 8 and peered in from the side, at which point he saw ISN 093 hanging. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(2)
(b)(2)

On the night of 09JUN06, Alpha Block had five people on duty. According to what I have been told, the NCO and (b)(3) (b)(6) were in the guard shack when the first detainee was discovered. Two other guards were passing each other in the Sally with one coming back and one going to chow, which started at 2300. This left the one guard who discovered the detainee on the tier. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6) Nobody could tell me at that time who walked the tier prior to finding first detainee. At approximately 0200 (b)(7)(C) showed up and I left the guards to sit in the conference room and went with (b)(7)(C) to my office and briefed him on my knowledge of events that point. Then (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C) from CITF showed up and (b)(7)(C) from FBI also arrived. I briefed them on what I knew so far. I then went to conference room and told everyone present to talk to NCIS. I received a call to go see Admiral at 0300. (b)(7)(C) needed every detainee off block so NCIS could move in. The moves started at approximately 0200, and were finished at approximately 0500. At 0500 (b)(7)(C) and I believe (b)(7)(C) and I, walked down and looked at the cells. The cells were already sealed and guards were stationed at the entrance to the block. In two cells I saw the blankets still hanging in corners. In the far cell, A12 the blanket was torn down. I also noticed the different preparation of dummies in each cell. ISN 093s cell had the most extensive preparations of the three detainees, and had created the most realistic "dummy". ISN 093 had multiple detainee-allowed items on his bed (b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

SECRET

Page 8 of 11

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

NCIS

1061

SECRET

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(C)

to make the dummy body. The dummy consisted of a toilet paper roll for the head, water bottles (possibly for shins) and shower shoes as feet. The thorax region of the dummy was a conglomeration of clothes. Cell A-12, in which ISN 588 was held, seemed to be the least prepared to me. There was not that much lying in ISN 588's cell. Cell A-5, in which ISN 693 was held, was somewhere in between the amount of preparation used in the other two. I did not touch anything. We did not enter or touch the cells. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

The guard that discovered ISN 093 stated that 093 had a rather elaborate mask over his face, that was secured to him with multiple straps wrapping around his head and the whole apparatus was connected, bound together. Later during the afternoon hours of the 10th, guards found four long strips of cloth made from a towel that were similar to what the 093 detainee had used to fabricate a complex noose in (b)(2) cell. A small bag made of soft cloth approximately the size of my fist was also found. (b)(2) was on Alpha block. (b)(1),(b)(6) and it seemed very odd to me that he would be fabricating such a device as the detainees who committed suicide were Arabs. (b)(2),(b)(6)

(b)(6) I believe. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

All camps are very quiet when we were visiting the cells. It was sort of odd because when there is unusual activity in the Camps the detainees are louder, and in this case they were not. (b)(3)

(b)(2)

As I look back on the events leading up to 10 JUNE there were several events that took place that I now feel should have triggered me to think something was going on, on Alpha block. First, 693 had gone off hunger strike just a week or two prior. 693 had been a long and dedicated hunger striker, perhaps being tubed feed longer than any other detainee in the camp. Secondly, 588 had given up his Koran on 18 May. In the whirlwind of events that occurred on 18 May, it never came clear to me that he had in fact turned in his Koran until after the events of 10 June. Turning in of a Koran by a detainee is significant as it demonstrates normally one of two things: Detainee is protesting some activity of the JDG or that he is about to do something that would disgrace his religion, more specifically commit suicide. I have always used that as an indicator for self-harm. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(1),(b)(6)

(b)(2)

(b)(2)

I just moved him out of Alpha block on (b)(3)
(b)(6)

SECRET

Page 9 of 11

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

NCIS

1062

(b)(3)
(b)(2) Wednesday evening, 07JUN06, at his request. The Admiral told me to go talk to ISN (b)(2) which I did in (b)(2) with (b)(3) the JTF Cultural Advisor, who joined me about 10 minutes after I had begun what turned out to be an hour or so meeting. (b)(2),(b)(3)

(b)(2)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7) There were various signs that something was going on with the detainees that I misread, this included the sudden large numbers of detainees dropping out of the hunger strike around Memorial Day weekend. This hunger strike started after 18MAY06 and lasted about two weeks. The number of hunger strikers dropped from having a high of approximately 84 down to 7 or 9 detainees. (b)(2)

(b)(2)

(b)(2) If detainees are not doing something, like beating on their cells for two hours, refusing to showers/recreation, or verbally taunting guards they are planning the next event I was interviewed for the TV show O'Riley factor on the day of 09JUN06, and I said the detainees were planning something more violent. Because of our concerns about next act being more violent we had sent out guard messages on 28MAY06 and 30MAY06 regarding High Vigilance During (b)(2) and the requirement to (b)(2)

(b)(2) We had taken several steps warning the guards to be more cautious particularly in (b)(2) (b)(2)

(b)(2) With the support of RDML HARRIS we had placed a (b)(2)

See Guard messages on 28MAY06 and 30MAY06 regarding High Vigilance During (b)(2)

(b)(2) Because suicide is against the detainee's religion, and detainees often talk about how Muslims are not supposed to commit suicide, the possibility of multiple detainee suicides on a block was viewed more as a ruse to put guards in a vulnerable situation. In past suicide attempts, other detainees make it urgently and loudly known that a detainee was carrying out some type of self-harm. Also, in the Western Judeo-Christian culture, we view those that would commit suicide as those who are depressed or who have some type of mental problem. Detainees with these symptoms are closely monitored and provided with psychological help/evaluations. The detainees who committed suicide did not exhibit these symptoms. Two of the three had been cleared by Behavioral Health Services just the week prior and were noted to be in good spirits. 093 refused to be seen by BHS which was consistent with past behavior. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3) In regard to what normal events and actions should be like on a block at roughly the same time of the day I offer the following. If you combine the various pieces of guidance contained within the SOP and within guardmount messages, here is what I would have expected to see on the block that night and is what routinely occurs on other blocks (b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)
(c)

nightly. (b)(2) inclusive of the block NCO. (b)(2) there would have been a headcount conducted and the results reported to the DOC. Evening chow would have been served and early evening call to prayer would have been carried out by the detainees. At some point prior to (b)(2) another headcount should have been carried out and done so at the direction of the DOC. During headcount, all detainee movement on that block stops and every detainee is accounted for using the standard of seeing skin or movement. That night I discovered unusual activity had occurred at approximately 2030 when the entirety of Alpha Block joined together in song for approximately 20 to 30 minutes. My expectation would have been that an interpreter would have been called to the block to determine what was being said and that a DIMS entry would have been made noting such abnormal activity. I am informed in the aftermath of the events that numerous detainees washed their blankets that day and hung them in their cells to dry. While that practice is allowed, the proper procedure would have been for the guards to allow the blankets to be hung only from the rear cell window and then to not cover the entire window. I am also informed that the detainees went to bed early that evening, around 2130. That too should have been annotated in DIMS as unusual activity. (b)(2)

(b)(2)

ten minutes to see either skin or movement. Based on the last headcount, another headcount should have occurred but no later than midnight should a third headcount been carried out. In that instance, the standard would again be to see skin or movement. If the guard could not see either, he should wake the detainee to ensure the detainee is present.

(b)(2)

tier, showers, searching of the rec yards, updating DIMS entries, restocking supplies, etc.

(b)(2)

been walked by the block NCO, the DOC of the camp and Platoon Leader of the camp.

The times that the SOG and PL walked the tier should have been recorded in DIMS. (b)(3)
(b)(6)

(b)(3)
(b)(6)
(b)(7)(C)

This statement, consisting of this page and two other pages was partially typed for me by (b)(7)(C) as we discussed its contents. In addition, I typed parts of the statement myself. I have read and understand the above statement. I have been given the opportunity to make any changes or corrections I desire to make and have placed my initials over the changes and corrections. This statement is true to the best of my knowledge and belief. (b)(3)
(b)(6) (b)(3) (b)(6) (b)(7)(C)

Signature

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 17th day of JUNE in the year 2006, at 1750. (b)(7)(C)

Witnessed by Representative Naval Criminal Investigative Service
AUTH: DERIVED FROM ARTICLE 136,
UCMJ (10 U.S.C. 936 and 5 U.S.C. 303