Missed Appointments: The CIA Responds

By Ken Silverstein

In recent months I wrote one item about a CIA officer who was expected to become the new station chief in Baghdad, and a second about another officer whom my sources told me was a top candidate to be the Baghdad deputy station chief. The station chief candidate withdrew after my first story ran; I have now received a letter from a CIA spokesman, Paul Gimigliano, criticizing both stories and saying the second candidate was not being considered for a post in Iraq.

Gimigliano's letter appears below, and my reply follows.

Ken:

Contrary to what you wrote in your column of March 23, the officer you discussed is neither considering, nor being considered for, service in Iraq. While her identity is protected by operational cover, I can tell you that she has been central over the years to the efforts of our government, and other governments, to discover and disrupt al-Qai'da operations worldwide. Her work, and the work she has led, has stopped terrorist attacks and saved innocent lives. The counter-terrorist expertise she has built and applied on behalf of our country is the product of great effort and exceptional commitment.

On January 28, you talked about another undercover officer. Curiously, he is described in that single piece both as favoring "tough methods" in the fight against terror and as being "very cautious." I'll be more straightforward: He has a distinguished career of service and leadership in a range of difficult assignments, here and overseas. That includes the front lines against al-Qai'da, and he is viewed within the CIA as decisive, effective, and courageous.

Both of these officers, and their agency colleagues, deserve better than the poisoned gossip of anonymous sources. Had you spoken to the CIA before you ran your stories, the agency at least would have tried to inject some balance into what you heard.

Paul Gimigliano

First, thanks to Gimigliano for the note.

I make a point of calling the agency when comment is warranted, and I did call the CIA about the first story. I called on a Sunday, but I left a message with the press desk. That was over two months ago and this is the first I have heard back; if I had received a reply at the time I would have included it in the story, or if the reply came in after publication I would have posted it as I'm doing now. (My experience has been that the agency frequently offers no comment, particularly on stories involving active-duty officers.) However, Gimigliano is correct that I did not call about the second story, and without a doubt I should have. That was an oversight on my part.

Gimigliano disputes that the second candidate is being considered for the post I mentioned. She may not be under consideration now, but a number of people with whom I spoke at the time said that her name was being floated.

Furthermore, some current and former intelligence officials simply don't share Gimigliano's enthusiasm for the two officers, both of whom have been involved in botched renditions. For instance, the second figure's role in the Khaled Masri rendition seems like a first-class screw-up. Most of my sources are not hostile to the CIA as an institution, but feel it has become ineffective, politicized, and irrelevant.

There are many people at the CIA who do not believe that "tough methods" have been useful. Which leads to my final point: there is no conflict, as Gimigliano suggests there is, between favoring "tough methods" in the fight against terror and being "very cautious." Under the Bush Administration, using "tough methods" is the cautious, bureaucratic move to make; refusing to do so can mean risking your career. As the last six years have made very clear, this posture has not served our country well.