Le Jihad au quotidien (Presses universitaires de France, 2004) forthcoming as Everyday Jihad (Harvard University Press—published May 15, 2007).

A brilliant young political scientist specializing in the sociology of Jihadist groups, Bernard Rougier taught at the Université St Joseph in Beirut from 1996-2002. He used this period to conduct extensive field research with a focus on the Ain al-Helweh refugee camp in South Lebanon. I met Rougier at a luncheon at NYU Law School's Center on Law and Security, hosted by the Center's director, Karen Greenberg, on Friday, Apr. 20, 2007.

Ain al-Helweh has a population of roughly 40,000 and a long history arising out of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. What is perhaps most striking about the camp today is just how disconnected it is from that conflict, and particularly from the Palestinian cause that used to dominate it. But that disconnection has not led to an internalization, but rather to outreach to a broader world of Islamicist activism, with frightening consequences for Western security. In the fascinating portrait provided by Bernard Rougier, Ain al-Helweh is a sort of microcosm for the Sunni activist world – offering safe habor of sorts to a vast menagerie of different groups. The foundation blocks certainly are the various organizations of the Palestinian opposition to Israel, including both those now struggling for control of the newly emerged Palestinian political structures and pure unreconciled outsiders. But beyond this, the camp has emerged as a sort of experimental laboratory for the vast range of thought emerging from under the cloak of politicized Islam today – all, at least, on the Sunni side of the spectrum. It seems, as Rougier says, a sort of microcosm of militant Sunni thought. Alarmingly, one of the uniting forces that Rougier identifies is a willingness to contemplate violence – both against structures of the teetering Lebanese state, and the enemies of militant Islam everywhere. “Strike the snake at the head,” was a bin Ladenism that Rougier found often quoted. The “snake,” of course, was Western civilization, and its head was the political leadership of the United States. Animosity towards Shiia Islam was also widespread, and violence against Shiites was also contemplated. “But there is a sort of Islamicist Machiavellianism,” Rougier said. By that he meant a reluctance to take steps that might undermine the security and stability of the camp itself. Considering the weakened situation in Lebanon and the rise of Hezbollah, anti-Shiia rhetoric was kept under control and discussion of violent action against Shiites was carefully kept under cover.

To what extent does this new, still more menacing manifestation of militant Sunni Islam result from the Bush Administration's Global War on Terror and the separation between the camp and its roots in Israel/Palestine? Rougier is careful to avoid direct attacks on administration strategy (complaining, however, about the difficulty of even engaging Washington's conservative think tanks in discussion of the issues), but this does seem a reasonable conclusion from what he says.

Among the most interesting aspects of Rougier's discussion are financial. He describes the network of Salafi or Wahhabi support for the camps, carried through specific clerical figures out of Saudi Arabia. This clearly is the lifeblood of the camp, but it also provides specific impetus to violence.

How is the new generation of militants at Ain al-Helweh different from the old? On this issue, Rougier scores some of his more remarkable points, though by now some are well established. First, the nationalistic mantel and rhetoric of the older generations is dying. The struggle is not viewed as “Palestinian” or as against Israel and for the establishment of a “Palestinian homeland.” It is broader and tied to a notion of Pan-Islamicism, though with a distinctly Arab cast. Second, the United States is supplanting Israel as the “enemy” to these aspirations. Third, Sunni Islam is viewed as under threat – a threat from the Shiia, but a threat unleashed by United States military operations in Iraq and by the U.S. proxy war in Lebanon (even though that war targeted Hezbollah, it actually served to empower and raise up Hezbollah). Fourth, the embrace of violence, and specifically terrorist tactics is more aggressive and enthusiastic than before.

The portrait that Rougier paints is dark and threatening and his work is another in a recent series of alarm bells ringing about the Middle East. We now stand six years into the Neoconservative Middle East project and the world it is creating is a pit of writhing snakes. Rougier offers one of the best and most realistic accounts yet.