Following up on the Iraq Fiasco with the CIA's Political Islam Expert

By Ken Silverstein

A few months ago, I interviewed Dr. Emile A. Nakhleh, who retired in late June as the director of the CIA's Political Islam Strategic Analysis Program. In that interview, Nakhleh said that “our presence is part of the problem” in Iraq and called for an immediate “exit strategy” at a time when the Bush Administration was insisting that the United States “stay the course.”

But things are changing in Washington, D.C. The New York Times just reported that a few days before outgoing Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was fired he issued a memo to the White House in which he suggested various strategies for reducing the U.S. presence in Iraq. “Begin modest withdrawals of U.S. and Coalition forces (start ‘taking our hand off the bicycle seat’),” Rumsfeld wrote, “so Iraqis know they have to pull up their socks, step up and take responsibility for their country.”

Meanwhile, the Democrats have taken control of Congress; the Bush Administration is on the defensive; and the Iraq Study Group is about to issue its much-anticipated report. With this in mind, I checked in with Dr. Nakhleh for an update and to find out whether it is actually possible for the United States to “take its hand off the bicycle seat.”

Nakhleh's view is that the situation in Iraq has spiraled out of control and is not likely to improve soon. What would help, he told me, is if the United States were to shift course and begin working with Iran, Syria, and other countries in the region in a last-ditch attempt to improve Iraq's fortunes. Needless to say, such an approach seems unlikely.

At a press conference last week, President Bush described Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki as “the right guy for Iraq.” Nakhleh was somewhat less sanguine, pointing out that al-Maliki is a product of sectarian politics who has failed both to rein in militias and to act forcefully against corruption. In the resulting absence of law and order, Iraq's sundry factions have concluded that they can achieve their goals only through violence.

“As a prime minister,” said Nakhleh, “al-Maliki is a figment of our imagination and our own creation. Some people call [Afghan President Hamid] Karzai the ‘Mayor of Kabul,’ but al-Maliki is not even the mayor of Baghdad. He's the mayor of the Green Zone—at best.” Echoing comments I've heard from Americans who have recently traveled to Iraq, Nakhleh said the idea of a functioning Iraqi government is fiction. “We're seeing the emergence of fiefdoms and strongmen,” he said. “Ministers can make decisions, but they can't implement them.”

The American military presence in Iraq is increasingly “irrelevant” to the country's unrelenting violence, Nakhleh said, and the security situation is unlikely to improve over the next year, “whether we have 10,000 or 150,000 troops stationed there.” Even so, he continued, the occupation remains a magnet for attacks against Iraqis, and of course, against coalition forces.

“The violence has taken on a life of its own,” said Nakhleh. “It may get worse after we withdraw but it won't necessarily get worse because we withdraw. Given the situation, why continue to lose soldiers and kill Iraqis? It makes no sense. I'm not saying that we need to leave this minute—but we need an exit strategy. Iraqis will ultimately be the ones who decide whether their country is going to break apart or not.”

Nakhleh fears that the Iraq Study Group's recommendations “will be overtaken by events,” or, at best, will be implemented “too little, too late.” While he preferred not to comment formally on the new Democrat-controlled Congress, Nakhleh gave no indication that he believed the new leadership would come up with ideas that could influence the Iraq war in a positive way.

For Nakhleh, the consequences of America's failure in Iraq will be numerous and long lasting. The United States has no credibility in the region, he believes, and at this point any policy initiative it undertakes will be perceived as being anti-Islamic. “Despite all of our military power, we've lost influence because that military power is seen to be of questionable utility in Iraq,” he said. “Other nations have more room to maneuver because we're seen as feckless or uninterested. The lofty plans—enunciated at the start of the war for restructuring Iraqi society through a liberal, democratic, and inclusive political and social system—have all but disappeared. The calls for liberal democracy and transparent government have been replaced by concerns for security and stability.”

How should the United States engage Iran and Syria? “Both of those countries can be pragmatic, but we need to recognize that they are going to want something in return.” In return for cooperation from Tehran and Damascus, Nakhleh said, the threat of regime change needs to be shelved. He also said that the United States will need to seriously address the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and “give a nod” to Syrian President Bashir Assad on helping to negotiate Israel's return of the Golan Heights.

I'd bet that many members of the foreign policy establishment, including some who belong to the Iraq Study Group, would endorse Nakhleh's recommendations—as long as they were speaking off the record. But few such “experts” will risk their careers by voicing such heretical opinions in public. This is extraordinarily unfortunate because—as Nakhleh pointed out— the incredible scale of violence taking place daily in Iraq means that time is of the essence.

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