The Osama endorsement:
Understanding the most dangerous constituency

Who do the terrorists want to be president? Americans who hate evil can be forgiven for discounting the complexity of the question. We like our politics straight. When we see bumper stickers, like those distributed at Kentucky G.O.P. fund-raisers this summer, proclaiming that “KERRY IS BIN LADEN'S MAN/PRESIDENT BUSH IS MINE,” we admire the clarity of the sentiment, without taking into account that the terrorist's choice might in fact be more nuanced. Politicians, in their rightful disdain for ambiguity, are even more likely to underestimate the subtlety of the terrorist mind. More and more of them are staking out the rhetorical terrain pioneered by U.S. Representative Tom Cole of Oklahoma last spring: “If George Bush loses the election,” he said, “Osama bin Laden wins the election. It's that simple.”

But is it really? Yes, Osama is evil, and therefore a reliable contra-indicator of what, or who, is good. If he is for a particular candidate, we certainly ought to be against that candidate. But figuring out who Osama actually prefers is a far more difficult matter. He has never openly endorsed any U.S. politician, nor has he made clear what characteristics he might be seeking in a candidate for president. One might assume, with Representative Cole and the Kentucky G.O.P., that Osama would prefer John Kerry, on the premise that “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”—Bush already being Osama's enemy. And yet Kerry has made clear that he would, if anything, widen the campaign against terrorism in general and against Al Qaeda in particular.

Even concerning the issues on which the candidates are more clearly divided, it is unclear where Osama himself would come down. Take gun control. On the one hand, Osama might prefer a Kerry administration, which presumably would attempt to tighten gun-control laws and thereby make the day-to-day work of terrorists a little bit safer. On the other hand, Bush might make it easier for the terrorists themselves to get the weapons they need. Who is to say which advantage Osama would find more compelling? The “character issue” also cuts both ways. Is Kerry, with his Massachusetts-style liberalism, more sympathetic to terrorist issues than Bush? Or would Osama feel more comfortable with a fellow fundamentalist in office? The point is, we can only guess.

The complexity of the Osama endorsement is compounded by the fact that Osama is a terrorist, and therefore may not be completely candid about his intentions. It is even possible that he will attempt to play our expectations against us. If he really wants Kerry to win the election, for instance, he might try to trick voters with reverse psychology by endorsing Bush. Or he might express an equal preference for both Bush and Kerry, in the hopes of boosting a third-party candidate—if not Ralph Nader, then perhaps Prohibition Party candidate Gene Amondson. Nevertheless, Osama's choice remains a tantalizing bellwether for American voters, who hope to perfect the nation in the mirror image of his boundless evil.

The most frustrating barrier to knowing Osama's mind is that his preferred method of political communication, mass murder, is an imprecise medium. If Al Qaeda were to attack before Election Day, what would it tell us about Osama's presidential favorite? There are now two entirely conflicting theories. For years, we believed that terrorism created a kind of reverse Stockholm Syndrome, causing the electorate to disproportionately revere the leaders fortunate enough to be in power at the time of an attack. But the Al Qaeda attack on Madrid last March, and the electoral defeat three days later of Spanish prime minister José María Aznar, changed all of that. Now we know that an attack might cause voters to throw out the very politicians under whose leadership that attack occurred, making terrorism an overt threat to incumbents everywhere. Complicating matters even further is the fact that terrorists know those theories exist and could act on either one of them—or, because they are terrorists, on some other premise entirely. In terms of game theory, the possibilities are endless.

The administration is not unaware of these intricacies. Since at least March, national-security officials have been working to clarify our understanding of the Osama endorsement and to help voters know how best to support their country this November. Unfortunately, their efforts have delivered mixed results.

In April, for instance, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice warned that we must “take very seriously the thought that the terrorists might have learned, we hope, the wrong lesson from Spain.” Her statement, though brief, is a masterpiece of subtle and layered logic. On first reading, she seems to be worrying that Al Qaeda learned the wrong lesson from Spain—i.e., learned that terrorist attacks are pro-incumbent, when in fact we now know they are anti-incumbent. But careful readers, Osama among them, will note that Rice actually “hopes” Al Qaeda has learned the wrong lesson. What could that mean? If Rice expects an attack, and she hopes Osama thinks an attack is pro-incumbent, then the implication is that she hopes Osama wants to keep Bush in office. This may seem cynical, but in fact it is a perfect demonstration of Rice's special genius. Beneath it all, the national security adviser is trying to fake out Osama. That is, if Osama thinks Rice wants him to “endorse” Bush, then maybe he won't—thereby saving untold lives.

In July, however, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge once again muddied the waters. He warned that “Al Qaeda is now moving forward with its plans to carry out a large-scale attack in the United States in an effort to disrupt our democratic process.” Then, citing Madrid, he added that “we know that they have the capability to succeed, and they also hold the mistaken belief that their attacks will have an impact on America's resolve.” Rather than resolve the ambiguity of the Osama endorsement, Ridge's statement only deepened it. Did Ridge think Osama was “mistaken” in his belief that his attacks could disrupt “our democratic process”? Or did he believe that Osama had “the capability to succeed”? And what did Ridge mean by “our democratic process” in the first place? One might assume that he meant the election, but of course Spain held its election without much difficulty three days after the attack, and the new president has taken office with little controversy. So what is the “process” Al Qaeda has in mind? More to the point, what is the process that Tom Ridge thinks Al Qaeda has in mind? The questions continue, circles within circles, and despite Rice's best efforts we remain without answers.

Probably the most important issue facing Americans and terrorists alike in the upcoming election is the war in Iraq. One of George W. Bush's applause lines in the State of the Union speech last January was that Al Qaeda “declared war on the United States, and war is what they got.” This sort of pandering to the terrorists would seem to give Bush a clear advantage in the Osama-endorsement sweepstakes. And yet Kerry, too, has said that we will remain in Iraq for the long term. Indeed, he says he would bring more nations into the effort. In any case, given our history of nonpartisan war transitions—Vietnam, for instance, was fought under two Democrats and two Republicans—Osama can be reasonably confident that, Republican or Democrat, the next occupant of the White House will be sure to continue supporting the kind of terror war that Al Qaeda has worked so many years to put in place.

Given that knowledge, then, and taking into account the essential dishonesty of terrorists, how can we ever know for sure what an attack would mean? Would it be a plea for “steady leadership in a time of change,” or for “strength at home, respect abroad”? And for that matter, what if there is no attack? Would it be a sign of approval from Osama—and therefore an endorsement—of whoever was leading the polls at the time of the non-attack? Or, given that we might expect it to be an endorsement, would not the non-attack then be, in fact, a counter-endorsement?

Perhaps we will never know. But it is to the credit of America's leaders that they continue the struggle to plumb Osama's desire. We are a hopeful nation, and though we may not find all the answers by November, we must believe that someday we will know Osama's wishes as well as we know our own.

Response: December 2004, page 7

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The Osama endorsement: Understanding the most dangerous constituency

The Osama endorsement:
Understanding the most dangerous constituency